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The Rise and Fall of Carly Fiorina 
An Ethical Case Study 
Craig Johnson 
George Fox Univeniity. Newberg, Oregon 
This study examines the controversial tenure of former Hewlett-Packard (HP) CEO Carly Fiorina using the ethical 
leadership constrnct. Fiorina rose quickly through the ranks at AT&T and Lucent Technologies to become the most 
powerful businesswoman in the United States when she took the helm at HP in 1999. She prevailed in a bitter proxy 
fight over the firm's merger with Compaq Computer. However, she was abruptly fired in 2005. Both the CEO and 
members of the HP board failed as moral persons and as moral managers, leading to Fiorina's ouster and the subse· 
quent HP spying scandal. HP went from one of the world's most admired companies to the target of criminal inves­
cigations and publ.ic criticism. Implications for leadership ethics are drawn from the experience of HP. and limitations 
of the ethical leadership construct are identified. 
Keywords: Carly Fiorina: celebrity CEOs; ethical culture; ethical leadership construct; Hewlett-Packard; pre-texting 
scandal 
C 1:u-leton (Carly) Fio1ina was the most powerful busi� nesswoman in the United States at the tum of the 
millennium (Nocera, 2006; Sellers, 1998). fn 1999, she 
was hired as the CEO of technology giant Hewlett­
Packard (HP), becoming the first woman to head a Dow 
30 company. She statTed in company commercials and 
joined with entertainment stars like Matt Damon, Ben 
Affleck, and Sheryl Crow to promote HP products at 
electronics shows (Stone. 2005). Her image appeared on 
the covers of business magazines and she was a regular 
at the World Economic Fomm in Davos, Switzerland. 
She became known by her first name only, like Michael 
Jordan and Mrutha Stewart. To HP employees and out­
siders alike, there was only one "Carly." 
In 2005, the HP board of directors fired Fiorina. 
Yet, both Carly and HP continued in the national 
spotlight. Fiorina published a memoir, Tough 
Choices, and appeared on 60 Minutes and on college 
campuses to defend her perfom1ance at HP. Fiorina's 
successor as board chair, Patricia Dunn, was accused 
of ordering investigations into board leaks that vio­
lated state and federal law (Robertson, 2007a). 
What accounts for Cfu-ly's fall from the heights of 
corporate America? A number of explanations have 
been offered, including Fionna's lack of operational 
skills, mru·ket conditions, recalcitrant employees. and 
gender bias. Although all of these may be contributing 
factors, in this article, I argue that her failure can also be 
explained from an ethical vantage point. Fionna has 
never been charged with a crime, as were many of her 
CEO contemporaries like John Rigas. Hank Greenberg, 
Dennis Kowslowski, and Mrutha Stewart Yet. the story 
of Carly Fiorina is a cautionary tale, revealing ethical 
shortcomings not only on Fionna's part but also on the 
part of HP board members. 
A Meteoric Rise and Fall 
Few could have predicted that Carleton Fiorina 
would become one of the most visible and int1uential 
corporate leaders in America (Burrows. 2003). The 
daughter of a law professor, Fiorina attended Stanford 
University, majoring in medieval history and philoso­
phy. She was a serious student who showed little of 
the dynamism that would later make her a charismatic 
leadet� She abandoned her plans to become a lawyer 
after one semester at UCLA Law School and earned 
an MBA at the University of Maryland instead. Once 
she settled into a business career, she quickly became 
a superstar. Fiorina entered AT&T as a low-level sales 
manager and soon drew the attention of top manage­
ment. She took on tough assignments and rapidly 
became "one of the great salespeople of her industry" 
(p. 95), rising to become president of North American 
sales. Fiorina played a key role in AT&T's spin-off of 
Lucent Technologies and was named to head Lucent's 
sales and marketing group. The firm's revenue and 
stock value rose dramatically during her time there. In 
1998, she was first named as Fortune magazine's most 
powerful female American executive. She continued 
to top this list throughout her tenure at HP (Loomis & 
Ryan, 2005). 
At the same time Lucent stock was soaring, HP 
was losing some of its luster. The company, founded 
by Bill Hewlett and David Packard in 1939 , was one 
of the first to offer such benefits as profit sharing, flex 
time, catastrophic insurance, and tuition assistance to 
employees. Founders Bill and Dave believed that the 
company made money because they were good to 
their people. The company's strong culture was based 
on a set of values known as the "HP Way." These 
principles included treating everyone with respect, 
sound finances, trust in employees, technical excel­
lence, teamwork, thrift, humility, and hard work. 
Following these principles paid off handsomely. 
According to journalist Peter Burrows (2003). 
HP had been wildly successful. It had never suffered 
so much as one annual loss in 63 years. But what 
made HP a management icon was how it achieved 
those results. For decades, the company had balanced 
stellar financial performance with unquestioned 
integrity, from how it kept the books to how it treated 
its employees and customers. It had plowed millions 
into the communities in which it did business, not 
only out of charity but out of a progressive self-inter­
est in keeping them strong. Put simply, it seemed HP 
had figured out the magic formula for how to run a 
company. Everyone won-investors, customers, 
managers, and employees. (p. 14) 
By the late 1990s. critics both inside and outside the 
company believed that HP had Jost the magic fom1u1a 
described by Burrows, Employees expected regular 
bonuses whatever their level of effort. HP was no longer 
a technical leader but had evolved into a huge bureau­
cracy resistant to change (Anders, 2003). It periodically 
missed earnings projections and its stock price lagged 
behind high-tech rivals like Dell and Sun Microsystems. 
Concerned that the company was becoming unwieldy, 
board members spun off the test and measurement busi­
nesses into a new firm called Agilent Technologies. 
CEO Lew Platt agreed to step aside. 
There was no clear internal successor to Platt. so 
the board hired an executive search fim1 to locate an 
outsider to lead the company (Anders, 2003). Soon, 
Carly Fiorina emerged as the leading candidate. 
Unlike Lew Platt, a quiet individual who largely 
shunned attention, Fiorina was media savvy. She epit­
omized the "celebrity CEO." Celebrity CEOS are 
bigger-than-life figures often called upon to rescue 
organizations. They enjoy the limelight, acting more 
like rock stars than traditional business executives 
(Khurana, 2002; Sloan, 200 1; Varchaver, 2004). 
Fiorina had never run a corporation and came out of 
a different industry. Her expertise was in sales and 
marketing, not in operations. 
To lure Carly to HP, the board offered a compensa­
tion package that included $65 million in stock options 
and restricted stock, a $3 million signing bonus, and 
a $I milJion annual salary with a $1.25 million to 
$3.75 million annual bonus. She also received more 
than $36,000 for mortgage assistance, a relocation 
allowance, and a contract that not only allowed her to 
use company planes for personal use but encouraged 
her to do so (Burrows, 2003). This package dwrufed 
anything offered to her predecessors. Lew Platt stayed 
on as an advisor to ease the transition and Richard 
Hagbom, founder of HP's printer business, agreed to 
act as board chair. Hagborn's strengths-his knowl­
edge of HP and operational skills-were to help com­
pensate for Fionna's weaknesses. 
The new CEO's arrival generated a great deal of 
excitement in the media and among employees at HP. 
After her hiring was announced at a major press con­
ference, Carly conducted a whirlwind tour of HP 
facilities to introduce herself. Business writers wrote 
of the new energy she brought to the moribund com­
pany and how she was going to take the firm in a 
badly needed new direction (Burrows & Elstrom, 
1999; Hardy, 1999). To many employees, Carly sig­
naled a welcome change, and a number of women 
looked to her as a role model. 
Fiorina believed that the HP Way was a major 
cause of the company's mediocre performance. She 
treated workers who clung to the HP Way as the 
opposition. Their devotion to the past put the fim1 at 
risk. For the company to move forward, those who 
resisted change would have to be removed. "If one­
quarter of the people in HP don't want to make the 
journey or can't take the pace," she told a repo1ter, 
"that's the way it has to be" (Malone, 2007, p. 378). 
Fiorina instituted three changes, in particular, that 
had a major effect on HP's culture. First, she shifted 
priority from nurturing employees to financial perfor­
mance. Financial results (sales and revenue growth, 
stock price) became the primary value under her lead­
ership. In one of her first meetings with her top man­
agers, Fiorina interrupted a presentation to say, "Let 
me make something very clear. You will make your 
numbers. There will be no excuses. And if you can't 
make your numbers, I. will find someone who can" 
(Burrows, 2003, p. 141 ). She was more concerned with 
revenue growth and earnings than were her predeces­
sors. Under previous leaders, reporting quarterly earn­
ings was routine. Not so under Carly. She and a team 
of advisors pored over the numbers, trying to put them 
in the best light. Whereas the company's founders were 
conservative, believing it better to underpromise m1d 
overdeliver, Fiorina continued to promise double-digit 
sales and revenue increases even in the face of the eco­
nomic downturn of2000-2001(Nee,2001). 
Carly's second major change initiative altered HP's 
reward metrics. The CEO replaced HP's profit-sharing 
plan with an incentive program that would provide 
a bonus to all employees if the company hit its finan­
cial targets. Salespeople, who had been salaried, now 
earned commissions based on individual sales. 
Commissions were handed out twice a year to keep the 
sales force from "coasting" until the last quarter 
(Burrows, 2001 ). 
Fiorina's third cultural change focused on structure. 
In the past, divisions at HP operated largely as indepen­
dent businesses focusing on the development and sale 
of particular products. This structure kept operating 
units smaller to maintain the finn's person-centered 
culture (Malone. 2007). Carly reduced 83 units to 4. 
Two "back end" units manufactured computers. print­
ers, and imaging equipment. These units then turned the 
products over to two "front end" units that targeted 
either consumers or cmporations (Burrows, 200 l ). 
Within a year, Lew Platt left HP, complaining that 
the new CEO wasn't listening to his advice. Board 
chair Dick Hagbom stepped down and Fiorina 
assumed the roles of both CEO and board chair. Her 
biggest supporter at first, Hagborn would grow 
increasingly concerned about Carty's shortcomings 
and later worked to remove her (Malone, 2007). 
Company cutbacks in 200 l marked a significant 
downturn in the relationship between Fiorina and her 
workforce. First, she asked employees to rake a vol­
untary pay cut or time off worth up to I 0% of their 
salary (Carly also passed up a $625,000 bonus). 
Eighty-six percent of the workforce complied, 
although they were told that the voluntary reductions 
did not guarantee that there would be no further lay­
offs. Still, when HP then instituted the biggest layoff 
in its history shortly thereafter, many workers felt 
betrayed (HP manager, personal communication, July 
15, 2007). How the layoffs we.re handled also under­
mined Fiorina's credibility. Previously, frontline 
managers decided which employees to cut. This set of 
reductions came from the top of the organization 
instead and seemed to have no relationship with per­
formance. Cms were across the board and involved 
both high and low producers. Managers got scripts to 
read to those who were affected. Laid-off employees 
only had a short time to clear out and say their good­
byes. This may have been common practice at other 
companies, but not at HP (Anders, 2003). 
A survey of 8,000 employees revealed widespread 
unhappiness about poor communication and poorly 
implemented decisions. This was a complete reversal 
of earlier surveys, which found that HP had some of 
the highest employee satisfaction scores in corporate 
America (Burrows, 2003; Malone, 2007). Some 
workers booed the CEO at company meetings. The 
company electronic bulletin board was shut down 
after employees used this forum to attack Fiorina. 
Employee dissatisfaction took the fom1 of active 
resistance in 2002. Carly launched merger talks wid1 
Compaq, a move that would add 65,000 employees and 
increase the company's presence in the computer mar­
ket. Current and past employee stockholders largely 
opposed the merger. They doubted that HP's culn1re 
could survive the influx of so many new workers 
{Malone, 2007). Their champion was board member 
Walter Hewlett, Bill Hewlett's eldest son. The board 
pushed for the Compaq deal over Hewlett's objections. 
An ugly, highly publicized proxy broke out. Fiorina dis­
missed Hewlett as "an academician and musician" in a 
letter to stockholders. Information about board deliber­
ations was leaked to the press, which would later 
prompt Fiotina to launch an investigation to identify the 
source(s). At a crucial junction in the proxy battle, she 
talked to investment managers at Gem1any's Deutsch 
Bank (who would earn $2 million in fees if the merger 
went through) to win their support. Bank officials are 
not supposed to consider existing financial relation­
ships when voting compm1y shares, and Deutsch Bank 
Jater paid a $750,000 fine to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates U.S. 
financial markets (Burrows, 2006). The merger passed, 
but only by a slight majority. Hewlett then unsuccess­
fully challenged the results in comt. 
2004 marked the last full year of Carly's tenure. By 
this point, HP stock had lost half of its value. Dell 
began to eat away at HP's highly profitable printer 
business (Elgin, 2005). The business press, which had 
once lauded Fiorina, began to complain about her lack 
of operational skills and failure to chart a coherent 
direction for the company. Employee morale continued 
to drop. The CEO and her board sparred over appoint­
ments to head divisions of the company, plans for fur­
ther reorganization, and suggestions that she hire a 
chief operating officer. Issues came to a head in the 
third quarter when the company badly undershot earn­
ings projections and it looked like Fiorina was sacrific­
ing others to cover for her mistakes. (She fired three 
executives in a 5 a.m. phone call for failing to meet the 
numbers.) The board removed Carly in February 2005. 
providing her with nearly $28 million in severance pay 
(Loomis & Ryan, 2005). Employees celebrated her 
departure. At HP's Boise facility, employees distrib­
uted Hostess Ding Dongs to announce, "'The witch is 
dead" (Malone, 2007, p. 386). Four pension funds 
holding HP stock filed a lawsuit claiming that the 
board had violated company policy by authorizing 
excessive severan.ce benefits without shareholder 
approval (Marquez, 2006). 
The board selected Mark Hurd from NCR to be 
Fionna's successor. In many respects, Hurd was the 
"UnCarly" (Hardy, 2007). The new CEO avoided the 
spotlight, turning down most interview requests and 
avoiding technology shows (Lashinsky, Burker, & 
Kaufman, 2006). Instead of traveling to the World 
Economic Forum, he spent a day working at a local 
Best Buy to leam how customers view HP products. He 
has restored the fim1's divisional structure to foster 
accountability and doesn't intimidate managers, believ­
ing that intimidation keeps them from doing their best. 
Under Hurd's leadership, the company has overtaken 
Dell as the largest PC manufacturer and its stock price 
has soared (Liedtke, 2008). 
New board chair, Patricia Dunn, started a second 
round of investigations of board leaks in 2006. driven 
in part by distrust and conflict between directors. 
Private investigators secretly spied on board members 
and gathered extensive background information on 
reporters and their spouses. They also obtained phone 
records of board members, employees, and jt1umalists 
under false pretenses (a process referred to as "pre-tex­
ting") and tried to install spyware on reporters' com­
puters (Nakashima & Noguchi, 2006). Fonner Reagan 
science advisor George Keyworth eventually admitted 
to being the source of the leaks and left the board. 
Earlier, the board had asked Keyworth to be a liaison 
to the media, sharing information about company 
developments. Fellow board members accused 
Keyworth of going beyond his mandate by leaking 
details about private board discussions to a CNET 
reporter. For his part, Keyworth denied sharing any 
confidential or damaging infom1ation (Richtel, 2006: 
Waldman & Lublin, 2006). 
Venture capitalist Tom Perkins resigned in protest 
over the spying tactics and the treatment of his friend 
Keyworth (Foley, 2006). Perkins then pressured the 
HP board (which initially kept silent about the leak 
investigation) to reveal why he quit. 
When details about HP's investigative tactics becan1e 
public, Dunn defended her decision to launch the probe 
in response to the disclosure of confidential infon11ation, 
arguing that the leaks had the potential to affect HP's 
stock price and that of other publicly held companies. 
However, she claimed that she didn't authorize the ques­
tionable methods (Waldman & Lublin, 2006). Later, 
Dunn was forced out of her post as board chair and 
Congress investigated. TI1e fom1er board chair, HP's 
ethics officer, and two private investigators were charged 
with identity theft and fraud. Dunn was acquitted and 
her codefendants pled guilty to misdemeanor charges 
(Robertson, 2007a). The company paid a $14.5 million 
fine to the State of California. The SEC found that HP 
illegally concealed the reason that Perkins had resigned 
from the board (Robertson, 2007b). 
For a company long known for its excellent reputa­
tion, the pre-texting scandal marked a new ethical low. 
Edward Whitfield (R-KY), chair of the House Energy 
and Commerce subcommittee that investigated the 
scandal, summed up the firm's problems this way: "For 
the highest-ranking officials of a company like Hewlett 
Packard to be aware of and seemingly approve this kind 
of activity J do not think speak'> well of their value sys­
tem or their culture" (Nakashima, 2006, par. 24). 
Hurd was also tainted by the scandal. He admitted 
to receiving information on the investigation but 
claimed that he left the details up to Dunn. He apolo­
gized for what had happened, pointing out that the 
board had lost sight of company values. The CEO 
then appointed a former federal prosecutor to gather 
facts on the way that HP conducts investigations. He 
began ethics training for executives and directors as 
part of a companywide ethics effort (Darlin, 2007). 
A Failure of Ethical Leadership 
The business and popular press blamed Fiorina's 
dismissal on poor execution, describing her as a 
leader who was better at creating and selling her 
vision than a t  running day-to-day operations. 
However, this analysis doesn't go far enough. First a 
leader's success or failure depends as much or more 
on moral reasoning as it does on strategic thinking 
(Paine, 1996). Billions were lost at Enron, Quest, 
Marsh & McLennan. Fannie Mae, AIG Insurance, 
and other finns because leaders engaged in unethical 
behavior and encouraged others to do the same. 
Second, focusing exclusively on Carly Fiorina's per­
fonnance overlooks the important role played by the 
board of directors in this narrative. 
The ethical leadership construct provjdes one 
framework for analyzing the behavior of both Fiorina 
and the HP board of directors. Many discussions of 
ethics are nonnative, outlining what leaders should do. 
In contrast, the ethical leadership construct is a social 
scientific approach to ethics and leadership that 
describes the behavior of ethical leaders. Trevino, 
Brown, and their colleagues (Brown & Trevino, 2006) 
define ethical leadership as "the demonstration of nor­
matively appropriate conduct through personal actions 
and interpersonal relationships. and the promotion of 
such conduct to foJJowers through two-way communi­
cation, reinforcement, and decision-making" (p. 595). 
According to this definition, the practice of ethical 
leadership is a two-part process (Brown, Trevino. & 
Harrison. 2005; Trevino, Hartman, & Brown, 2000). 
One, ethical leaders function as moral persons, behav­
ing morally in their leadership roles. They are seen as 
honest. caring, and principled individuals who make 
fair decisions. Two, ethical leaders function as moral 
managers who promote ethical conduct in followers. 
They serve as role models, focus organizational atten­
tion on ethics and values, and reinforce ethical behav­
ior through rewards and punishments.  In so doing. they 
create more positive ethical climates (Johnson, 2007). 
In contrast to the ethical leader, the unethical 
leader is weak as both a moral person and a moral 
manager. This type of individual (Sunbeam former 
CEO Al Dunlap, WorldCom's Bernie Ebbers) acts 
immorally and promotes such behavior in the organi­
zation. The ethicaJly neuu·al leader falls somewhere 
in between ethical and unethical classifications. On 
the moral person dimension of ethical leadership, the 
ethically neutral leader is seen as more self-centered 
than people centered. On the moral manager compo­
nent of ethical leadership, the ethically neutral leader 
is more focused on the bottom line than on values and 
principles. This generates the impression that the 
leader is neutral when it comes to ethical concerns. 
The Ethically Neutral CEO 
Carly Fiorina can best be categorized as an ethically 
neutral leader (Trevino et al.. 2000). There is plenty of 
evidence that she was perceived, fairly or unfairly, as 
more self-centered than other centered. In particular, 
the CEO seemed to lack three important leader charac­
ter traits: compassion, integrity, and humility. 
Compassion. Compassion (kindness, generosity, 
love, and concern) describes an orientation that put� 
others ahead of the self (Peterson & Seligman. 2004). 
Ethical leaders exercise power on behalf of followers: 
unethical leaders pursue selfish ends. Coworkers at 
Lucent and at AT&T describe Carly Fiorina as a com­
passionate leader who brought in food for those who 
worked late and would offer to put up coworkers and 
guests at her house if the airport closed during bad 
weather. She appeared much less compassionate during 
her stint at HP. To begin, she came to the company with 
a contritct that appeared to put her needs first (although 
she claims that she lost $85 million when she left 
Lucem). Once at HP. Carly put significant distance 
between herself and the workforce. Bill Hewlett and 
Dave Packard popularized the concept Management by 
Wandering Around (MBWA). They would regularly ta1k 
to engineers, for example, <md often roamed the halls. 
Any employee at any level had immediate access to the 
founders. Lew Platt ate at the company cafeteria twice a 
week. In contrast, Fiorina rarely mixed with employees 
and hired a bodyguard. She expected to be treated not 
like everyone else but as the CEO of a major corporation 
(Burrows, 2003). Carly also seemed at times to overlook 
the human costs of her plans. The Compaq merger, for 
exrunple, meant the loss of thousands of additional jobs. 
Her apparent indifference stands in shrup contrasr to the 
attitude of her successor. Hurd has overseen massive 
layoffs as well but notes, "I don't want to forget we took 
15,000 jobs out of the compru1y and told a lot of 
emp.loyees to go home and tell their families that they no 
longer have jobs" (Darlin, 2006, p. I). 
Integrity. Leaders with integrity are perceived as 
trustworthy because they act consistently and carry 
through on their commitments. They inspire greater 
loyalty and commitment from followers. Perceived 
inconsistency was a major problem for Carly. She had 
a tendency to chart broad policy changes without 
understanding their effect and made promises she 
couldn't keep (Burrows, 2006). When she did fail, she 
was quick to blame the company's culture and other 
managers rather than to take personal responsibility. 
Employee loyalty and commitment suffered as a result. 
Humility. Humility emerges as a key feature of out­
standing leaders in the work of Jim Collins (2001 ). 
Leaders of great companies. according to Collins, 
deflect credit for the success of their organizations to 
others, shun the spotlight, and live modestly. Morris, 
Brotheridge, and Urbanski (2005) define humility as 
(a) a realistic appraisal of the self (of strengths and 
weaknesses); (b) openness to new ideas and knowl­
edge; and (c) tmnscendence-recognition that there 
are greater forces at work and that followers have 
much to contribute. 
Lack of humility may well be the single most 
important contributor to Carly's fall from power. In 
her memoir, Fiorina (2006) notes that she turned down 
many requests for interviews. Yet, there is little doubt 
that she enjoyed the media attention. Her publicity 
efforts, including her appearance in HP commercials, 
seemed to promote Carly more than HP. Furt11en11ore, 
she failed to demonstrate realistic self-appraisal, 
openness to new ideas, or a sense of transcendence. 
Fiorina was extremely confident in her abilities. For 
example, she rejected board suggestions that she hire 
a chief operating officer, saying at one point that "a 
CEO had better have his or her hands on the wheel" 
(Loomis & Ryan, 2005. p. J 00). (Her refusal to a..,k for 
help was a key factor in the board's decision to fire 
her.) A top-down communication style discouraged 
feedback and devalued the input of employees. Until 
the end, she seemed to think that the fate of HP rested 
entirely on her shoulders. She apparently made no 
effort to groom a successor and drove a number of tal­
ented executives away, including many from Compaq 
(Elgin et al., 2005� Nocera, 2006). 
Carly fell short where the company's founders 
excelled. Bill and Dave could be gruff and demanding 
but were seen as compassionate at heart They ago­
nized over layoffs and, according to company lore, 
would apologize for angry outbursts. They created one 
of the most humane workplaces in the United States. 
The founders also served as models of integrity. HP 
products were expensive but they were dependable. 
WaU Street could trust the numbers that Hewlett and 
Packard presented to analysts (Malone, 2007). FinaUy, 
Bill and Dave were humble to a fault, serving burgers 
at company picnics, d1iving old cars, and showing up 
at local hardware stores on the weekend. 
Not only was Fiorina seen as self-centered, she 
also fell short as a moral manager. Press accounts 
mention few of her ethical initiatives. She focused 
instead on other priorities like increasing earnings 
and stock price, which made her appear unconcerned 
about traditional HP values like concern for people, 
respect, tmst, and cooperation. Fiorina put HP at eth­
ical risk through her obsession with making the 
numbers. Just how much risk can be seen by the near 
collapse of Lucent after she departed for HP. 
At Lucent, Fiorina also believed in setting high 
sales targets to drive up the firm's sales price. Under 
her direction. sales managers used a variety of tactics 
to build sales, including loosening credit tenns, pres­
suring customers to buy immediately so that sales 
could be booked in the current quarter rather than the 
next, and vendor financing-loaning up to the entire 
purchase price to dot-com companies. Many of these 
dot-com firms went bankrupt without repaying 
the loans. Unethical sales practices were a major 
contributor to Lucent's financial woes (Burrows, 
2003). By late 2002, 100,000 employees were 
laid off and its stock sank to $ l. The SEC accused 
Lucent of improperly booking $1.l billion in rev­
enue in 2002. The finn had to pay creditors of 
Winstar Communications $224 million for pressur­
ing the company into buying unneeded telecommu­
nication ec1uipment (Gold, 2005). 
At HP, there is evidence that Carly's pressure to 
make the numbers undermined the firm's ethical stan­
dards. Salespeople began to engage in "channel 
stuffing"-offering discounts or other incentives to 
get a buyer to purchase more of the product than they 
had originally planned. This practice essentially books 
future sales in the current quarter. Channel stuffing 
boosts quarterly results but drives down long-tenn 
demand because the customer now has a large supply 
of the product. It encourages accounting tricks and 
often leads to unprofitable sales. Carly didn't actively 
promote the practice at HP but didn't discourage 
it either, calling channel stuffing "a technical term" 
(Burrows, 2003, p. 169). Analysts, who had long looked 
to HP as a model of integrity, began to question HP's 
quarterly reports (Elgin et al., 2005). 
Changing the reward and evaluation systems and 
corporate structure also had negative ethical conse­
quences. Individual rewards undern1ined HP's collabo­
rative culture that emphasized teamwork. The focus 
shifted from selling more profitable products that would 
benefit the company to selling low-margin items to 
boost personal income (Burrows, 2003). Many employ­
ees felt betrayed when bonuses were denied, further 
undennining tmst and cooperation. Consolidating divi­
sions increased Carly's power. CEOs of large organiza­
tions are always powerful and intimidating, but Fiorina 
was more so than most. She would, as noted earlier, use 
her power to intimidate followers (Kramer, 2006 ). 
Employees were reluctant to challenge the CEO, 
remaining silent about their doubts about her plans. 
Fear and silence are warning signs of possible moral 
failure because they prevent followers from speaking up 
when they note ethical misconduct (Jennings, 2006). 
The Board: Shunning Ethical 
Responsibilities and Sanctioning 
Criminal Conduct 
In contrast to Carly Fiorina, who is best classified 
as ethically neutral. HP directors can best be 
described as unethical. They demonstrated significant 
weakness both as moral persons and as moral man­
agers. Their inadequacies as moral persons stemmed 
in large part from their neglect of their ethical duties 
as board members. Specifically, HP directors 
I. ignored the founding values and principles of the 
company when setting a new direction instead of 
using them as an ethical foundation for change. 
2. failed to have a succession plan in place. Board 
members have a moral duty to plan for the orderly 
transition of power, to ensure the development of 
leaders who can step in when senior executives 
move or retire (Charan, 2005). The succession 
process at HP was haphazard at best. Driven by 
faulty analysis and inadequate succession planning, 
board members began to search for someone who 
could "save" the company. ln the em of the celebrity 
CEO, charismatic Carly Fiorina fit the bill. 
3. put personal agendas above the good of the com­
pany. Board members seemed more interested in 
fighting one another and in investigating leaks than 
in being stewards of the corporation. Fiorina bat­
tled Perkins and Keyworth, as did Dunn. (Perkins 
and Dunn continued to snipe at each other in the 
press even after both had left the board.) They 
managed to do serious damage to HP's reputation 
as a result. Disgusted by the board's behavior, 
managers of two large pension funds proposed that 
shareholders be allowed to nominate a slate of 
directors (Darlin, 2007). 
4. disregarded employee input. Employees are a crit­
ical stakeholder group in any work organization. 
Ethical leaders take the concerns of important 
stakeholder groups into account when making 
decisions. Board members at HP. on the other 
hand, apparently devalued the concerns of HP 
workers despite widespread evidence that 1hey 
were unhappy with Carly's leadership. If the board 
had taken these concerns seriously. it likely never 
would have gone through with the Compaq merger 
that was opposed by current and past employees. 
Credit for the subsequent success of the merger 
should largely go to the HP employees who, once 
they lost the proxy battle, ensured that the integrn­
tion of two firms went smoothly (Malone, 2007). 
5. failed to provide adequate direction and oversight. 
Dick Hagborn could have provided important 
counsel to Carly and served as a check on her 
power if he had stayed as board chair. Instead. he 
stepped out of this role. Other evidence of lack of 
oversight includes the fact that the board never met 
to discuss the Compaq merger without Carly being 
present Directors also boosted her potential bonus 
from $3 million to $9 million in 2001, despite the 
company's erratic performance and when the com­
pany was engaged in the largest layoffs in its 
history. Later, they softened Fiorina's exit with a 
highly generous compensation package that 
appeared to reward her poor performance and gen­
erated a lawsuit from investors. 
In addition to failing to take their responsibilities 
seriously, individual board members directly engaged 
in unethical behavior. Board member Robert 
Wayman used his contacts to put Fiorina in touch 
with investment bankers at Deutsch Bank during the 
proxy fight. Keyworth revealed information about 
board deliberations to the press and then kept his 
actions to himself. Rather than dealing with this 
breach internally, board chairs Fiorina and Dunn 
authorized investigations that resulted in criminal 
activity. Dunn, with the approval of the corporate ethics 
office and outside counsel, approved pre-texting, sur­
veillance, computer tracers, background checks, and 
other unethical and illegal activities. 
Board members also failed as moral managers. They 
modeled unethical behavior through in-fighting, ignor­
ing employee input, and spying. They focused attention 
away from important values, devaluing HP's ethical 
heritage. Only board member Walter Hewlett seemed 
concerned that Fiorina was dismantling the HP Way. By 
approving Carly's change initiatives, the board helped 
create a system that promoted unethical behavior. 
Discussion 
The ethical leadership construct is a useful tool for 
analyzing the fall of Carly Fiorina and HP's subse­
quent pre-texting scandal. According to this 
approach, the practice of ethical leadership includes 
two pil1ars: the moral person and the moral manager. 
Ethical individuals behave morally in their leadership 
roles and, at the same time, promote ethical conduct 
in followers. Both Fiorina and the board fell short of 
this standard. Fiorina acted as an ethically neutral 
leader who gained a reputation for being self-cen­
tered. She was perceived as lacking compassion, 
integrity, and humility. Her focus on the bottom line 
and individual rewards weakened the firm's ethical 
culture. For its part, the board of directors acted as 
unethical leaders who were weak as both moral 
persons and moral managers. Board members failed 
to carry out the ethical responsibilities incumbent in 
their roles. They directly engaged in unethical behav­
ior and sanctioned criminal activity. Through their 
poor example and disregard for HP's ethical heritage, 
the directors undennined the firm's moral reputation. 
Applying the ethical leadership construct to Carly 
Fiorina's tenure at HP demonstrates, first of all, that a 
leader's success will depend as much on such virtues as 
humility and compassion as it does on such skills as 
public speaking and strategic thinking. Character needs 
to be an important component of any CEO selection 
process. Second, this case suggests that ethical neutral­
ity may be a misnomer. Carly Fiorina didn't deliber­
ately set out to create an unethical culmre. Nonetheless, 
her perceived self-centeredness and single-minded 
focus on financial objectives unde1mined HP's ethical 
climate. Her experience should serve as a caution to 
other CEOS charged with organizational turnarounds. 
Leaders need to continually remind followers of the 
importance of achieving goals through ethical means. 
Merely ignoring ethical concerns is sufficient to put an 
organization at risk for corruption and scandal. 
Third, HP's experience is further evidence that 
celebrity CEOs like Carly Fiorina aren't worth the risk. 
Quiet (and generally more effective) leaders have 
replaced many of their flashier predecessors at HP and 
elsewhere (Crosariol, 2005). Such quiet leaders appear 
less susceptible to the abuse of power and position. 
Fourth, viewed through the lens of ethical leader­
ship, what happened during and alter Fionna's tenure is 
a reminder that boards of directors are ultimately 
responsible for the organization's moral culture. Board 
members select chief executives, supervise !:heir activi­
ties, and approve their policies. Irresponsible directors 
like those at HP put the organization's ethical reputation 
at risk. Board members must act as moral persons and 
moral managers by setting a moral example, promoting 
values, and ensuring that ethical conduct is reinforced. 
Fifth, the rise and fall of Carly Fiorina and HP 
highlight the fact that a firm's ethical heritage can be 
its greatest asset. HP had a set of values and princi­
ples that allowed it to prosper over six decades of 
technological change. The company lost the trust of 
its employees, investors, and the public by setting 
these ethical standards aside. 
In addition to demonstrating the benefits of using 
the ethical leadership framework, this case also 
demonstrates its limitations. One major component of 
the construct-ethical neutrality-needs further defi­
nition and clarification. As noted above, the tenn eth­
ically neutral is misleading. Labels like se{f {ocused 
and pragmatic appear to be better descriptors for 
leaders who have other priorities besides ethics. The 
experience of Carly Fiorina demonstrates that, when 
it comes to moral management, there is no neutral 
ground. Unethical leaders actively promote immoral 
behavior; ethically neutral leaders foster unethical 
organizational climates through neglect. 
The ethical leadership framework also fails to 
account for the relationship between incompetence and 
immoral leadership. Fiorina and the HP board were 
both ineffective and unethical. Carly's centralized cor­
porate structure prove-0 unwieldy at the same time that 
it stifled dissent, for instance. By rewarding the CEO 
regardless of her perf onnance, the board wasted funds 
while creating perceptions of unfairness and impropri­
ety. This mix of incompetence and immorality is com­
mon among leaders, leading Ciulla (2005) to argue that 
the relationship between ethics and effectiveness is at 
the core of leadership ethics. She defines "good" 
leaders as those who are both competent and moral 
(Ciulla, 2004). Kellerman (2004) uses the same 
ethics/effectiveness framework when developing a 
typology of "bad" leaders. Addressing this interplay 
between ethics and effectiveness will strengthen the 
explanatory power of the ethical leadership construct, 
making it an even more robust analytical toot 
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